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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XIV JUNE, 1929 NUMBER 4
WHAT PRICE BANKRUPTCY: A PLEA FOR
"FRIENDLY ADJUSTMENT"t
THOMAS CLIFFORD BILLIG*
During the past four months,' the public press has been filled with
startling disclosures concerning the administration of bankruptcy in
the Southern District of New York. On January io, 1929, as a result
of abuses brought to their attention, the six federal judges sitting in
this district2 ordered a sweeping investigation into bankruptcy con-
ditions by the federal grand jury.3  On January iith, under the
leadership of United States Attorney Charles. H. Tuttle, the grand
jury began its investigation,4 and during the next eight weeks sum-
moned witnesses and heard testimony concerning 5,ooo different
bankruptcy cases.5 As a result of their findings and on their recom-
mendation,' Mr. Tuttle on March 6th petitioned the Federal Judges
for a general public investigation.7 This was granted by the United
States District Court, and Federal Judge Thomas D. Thacher was
selected to preside." In the meantime, the federal grand jury con-
tinued to probe matters brought before it and to investigate con-
ditions that will be sifted even more thoroughly in the general public
inquiry before Judge Thacher, which began on April 23rd.9
In the period covered by these developments, two prominent New
York attorneys 0 pleaded guilty to embezzlement of funds while
jThis article was prepared under the supervision of Professor Wesley A. Sturges,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Legal Science
at Yale University.
*Sterling Fellow, 1927-1928, Yale University School of Law.
'Jan. I-May 6, 1929.
2 John C. Knox, Thomas D. Thacher, Henry W. Goddard, William Bondy,
Francis A. Winslow and Frank J. Coleman.
The jusrisdiction of this district covers eleven counties, the only three having
large commercial standing being New York, Bronx, and Westchester. New
York Times, Dec. 30, 1927.
3New York Herald-Tribune, Jan. II, 1929.
41bid.
5New York Sun, Mar. 7, 1929; New York World, Mar. 7, 1929.
6 Ibid. 71Wid. sibd.
9New York Evening World, Apr. 23, 1929; New York Evening World, Apr. 25,
I929; New York Times, May 3, 1929. See infra note g.
'
0 Merrill E. Gates, Jr. and David H. Gladstone. New York Sun, Feb. ig, 1929.
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serving as trustees and receivers in bankruptcy cases, and were
sentenced to imprisonment ;11 one federal judge12 resigned from office
under the fire of grave charges of official misconduct; one federal
auctioneer, 3 in office for twenty-five years, was removed and indicted
for bankruptcy irregularities; one attorney14 (under investigation for
corrupt practices in bankruptcy administration and since indicted for
embezzlement) resigned from practice in both federal and state courts
and from participation as receiver or trustee in bankruptcy cases;
and, as a final climax, Attorney David Steinhardt, the key witness in
the government's probe into the bankruptcy ring and a fugitive from
justice since last December, committed suicide 5 April 19 th, on the
eve of his surrender to the federal authorities. Steinhardt, the day
before his death, sent a statement to United States Attorney Tuttle
making extensive disclosures concerning New York bankruptcy evils.
This document Mr. Tuttle proposes to use as the basis for his general
inquiry. 6
These are only the high lights in a series of events startling in their
disclosure of inefficiency and corruption. A number of other persons
have been indicted, scores have been questioned, and a public in-
vestigation precipitated which threatens to result in a general over-
hauling of the bankruptcy laws.' @ Already two local reforms have
been instituted by the Federal District Court. One was the selection
on January 6th of the American Exchange-Irving Trust Co. (now the
Irving Trust Company) to handle all receiverships in bankruptcy.17
The other was the designation on February 7th of The Underwriters
Salvage Company of New York as "an" official auctioneer' s succeed-
"New York Sun, Feb. 26, 1929.
12Judge Frances A. Winslow. New York Evening Post, Apr. i, 1929. See
New York World, Mar. 2, 1929, giving Federal Grand Jury's report on Judge
Winslow (quoted in part at infra note 35), and New York Evening Post, Mar. 2,
1929, which sets forth the formal impeachment charges by Representative F. H.
LaGuardia of New York against Federal Judge Winslow on the floor of the House
of Representatives. See also infra note 4o .
13Charles T. Shongood, removed without explanation by order of six District
Judges (New York Telegram, Jan. 28, 1929), and indicted by Federal Grand Jury.
New York World, Feb. 5, 1929.
14Marcus Helfland. New York Sun, Apr. 1, 1929. See also New York Evening
Post, Mar. 2, 1929, and New York Evening World, Apr. 2, 1929 (report of
indictment).
"5New York Times, Apr. 20, 1929. '6New York Sun, Apr. 24, 1929.
HaSee supra note 9 and infra note 62.
'
7The Trust Company will not act as receiver in equity cases, wherein there is
litigation and the judges appoint a receiver. New York Times, Jan 17, 1929.
See infra note 23.
18New York Sun, Feb. 8, 1929.
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ing Charles Shongood, previously referred to as removed from office
and indicted for misappropriation of bankrupt funds. Still further
investigation and reform are contemplated, and-to this end the bar
associations of New York19 and the National Association of Credit
Men are lending their co6peration and assistance.
In view of these events, it is highly important to analyze in an
impartial manner the actual results obtained in bankruptcy adminis-
tration throughout the United States, and to try to arrive at the
cause of some of its weaknesses. While the New York situation is
primarily a striking example of fraudulent practice, it is also strong
evidence of flaws in the system itself.20  That system, as such, I
propose to examine from the standpoint of both theory and practice,
and to compare the results obtained under it with those obtained
under "Friendly Adjustment"-the outstanding extra-legal means
devised as an alternative to proceeding in bankruptcy.
THE CASE AGAINST BANKRUPTCY
The present bankruptcy law was enacted July i, i898 and, together
with the amendments thereto and the General Orders in Bankruptcy
adopted by the Supreme Court, constitutes the authority for all
bankruptcy administration in the United States. It is a system of
jurisprudence which grew out of special needs on the part of the
business community, for which the "standard equipment"2' of the
19Three bar associations (The Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
The New York County Lawyers' Association and the Bronx County Bar Associ-
ation) in response to an invitation to name counsel to assist Mr. Tuttle, have
selected Colonel William J. Donovan. New York Evening World, Apr. 27, 1929.
An item in the New York Evening Post, May i8, 1929, states that these three
bar associations have taken over the public investigation begun under Mr.
Tuttle and will pay for continuance of it.
The National Association of Credit Men and the New York Credit Men's
Association manifested their coaperation in several ways. The Frauds Bureau
of the N. A. C. M. assisted materially in gathering the evidence presented at the
public inquiry before Judge Thacher. The N. A. C. M. also appointed a com
mittee to study bankruptcy procedure. And the New York Credit Men's Associ-
ation aided Mr. Tuttle's assistants in making a survey of 5,ooo New York bank-
ruptcy cases, this survey forming the basis of the general public inquiry. New
York Sun, Mar. 7, 1929. New York American, Apr. 15, 1929.
20"The Bankruptcy statute, although a creation of the human mind, provides
a well-nigh perfect system of jurisprudence by which the rights of creditors are
zealously protected, and the honest bankrupt can avail himself of this kindly,
humane, benevolent legislation and obtain a discharge from the payment of his
debts, thereby obtaining a new lease of business life.'! Samuel C. Duberstein of
the Brooklyn bar, quoted in IsAAc, FACTS ABouT BANKRUPTCY (1928) 259.
21Sturges, Commercial Arbitration (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 480, 489.
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law courts had proved inadequate. As generally conceded, it has two
major purposes: (i) to furnish to a debtor, whose liabilities are
greater than his assets, a method for turning over his property to
creditors and beginning his economic life anew, free from debt; (2)
to distribute the debtor's assets proportionately among his creditors.
How well the objects of the Act are fulfilled and whether the system
does meet the requirements of the business community can best be
demonstrated by a consideration of bankruptcy administration in
terms of actual facts and figures.
The Statistics of Bankruptcy Proceedings for the fiscal year ending
June 3o , 1927, include the following summary of cases (voluntary and
involuntary) for the entire United States :22
Number of cases concluded .................. 48,269
Total liabilities ........................... $885,557,335.03
Unsecured liabilities ....................... 672,498,083.28
Secured and preferred liabilities ............. 213,059,251.75
Total realized from assets .................. 96,558,929.90
Total paid secured and preferred creditors .... 28,484,578.92
Total paid general creditors ................ 43,6o9,75o.8o
Total administration expenses (including at-
torney's fees) ........................... 21,342,o66.64
Attorney's fees ........................... 7,3o6,335.43
Reduced to percentages, these figures are:
Percentage total administration expense to amount
realized ......................................... 22.10
Percentage attorney's fees to amount realized .......... 7.57
Percentage paid general creditors as to unsecured liabilities' 6.48
Percentage paid all classes of creditors as to liabilities... 8.14
The involuntary cases for the entire United States during the same
period show the following figures:
Cases concluded (including 48o petitions dis-
missed and 439 compositions confirmed)..... 5,974
Total liabilities ............................ $356,972,102.30
Unsecured liabilities ........................ 303,260,505.13
Secured or preferred liabilities......... ..... 53,711,597.17
Realized from assets ........................ 6o,842,042.48
Total paid secured or preferred creditors ...... I3,725,379.o6
Total paid general creditors ................. 30,781,344.02
Total administration expenses (including at-
torney's fees) ............................ 14,111,971.33
Attorney's fees ............................ 4,900,924.07
Percentage total administration expense as to
amount realized .......................... 23.18
Percentage paid general creditors as to unsecured
liabilities ................................ 10.11
Percentage paid all classes of creditors as to
liabilities ................................ 12.49
2RxEr. ATTY. GEN. 1927, at 178.
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One of the worst features in this survey is the extremely low
percentage realized by general creditors on their unsecured liabilities
(io.ii% during 1926-27 for the involuntary cases alone and 6:48%
for voluntary and involuntary cases combined). The sources of this
are not difficult to find, and they constitute the principal counts
against the bankruptcy system. They are:
(i) The problem of obtaining reasonable prices for the bank-
rupt's assets.
(2) The high cost of bankruptcy administration.
(3) The non-co6peration of creditors.
THE MARKETING PROBLEM
The first of these, the marketing problem, arises from the fact
that the settlement of an insolvent estate is normally an economic
and not a legal function. In the troublesome case of fraudulent
concealment of assets by the debtor, legal machinery is of course
necessary. But in the average case of a business which goes to the
wall, the debtor is more often inefficient than dishonestsa and the
claims of his various creditors are not active litigations. Under such
conditions, the ordinary procedure of the liquidating agent is to
reduce the debtor's assets to cash, to pay the expenses of liquidation,
and then to distribute whatever remains to the creditors.
In carrying out these steps, the first source of difficulty is the
frequent employment of a receiver or trustee who is skilled in the
law rather than in merchandizing. The estate is thus deprived of
whatever advantage accrues from commercial experience and
efficiency in the sale of stocks, for not only is the receiver an unskilled
merchandizing man himself, but it is also unprofitable for him to
assemble about him for the purposes of a single case a staff trained
in the disposal of bankrupt stocks. This, of course, is not true in the
Southern District of New York since January I7 th, for now the
Irving Trust Company of New York City, with a staff of some sixty
persons devoting their full time to bankruptcy administration, is
acting as receiver in all bankruptcy cases .2 There are occasional
22aBradstreet's summary of causes of failures in the United States for 1928
shows that only 544 failures out of 20,373 were due to fraud on the part of the
debtor. Incompetence of the debtor was responsible for 6,396 failures and lack
of capital for 7,290 others. "Specific conditions" (disaster, war, floods, etc.) took
a toll of 3,613. Causes for the remainder include inexperience, unwise credits,
neglect, and competition.
211n a report published in New York World, Mar. 2, 1929, the Irving Trust
Company announced that it had been appointed receiver in sixty-four bankruptcy
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exceptions in other cities also, as in Pittsburgh, where the more
lucrative receiverships and trusteeships are sometimes filled by trust
companies specially staffed to handle bankruptcies. These instances,
however, are still much in the minority.
The second source of difficulty is that the assets are usually sold
at public auction.24 Theoretically, the trustee may choose to conduct
a private rather than a public sale of the assets,25 but, as a practical
matter, he generally will have neither the organization nor the time
to sell advantageously to private purchasers. Therefore, the public
sale and its resulting low returns is virtually forced upon him. This
not only means the added expenses involved in advertising and con-
ducting a public sale, but also other losses. Too often the buyers
who attend anticipate paying little for the bankrupt stock, for a
public sale of this nature is a forced sale, and they are well aware of
it. Then, too, collusion among the prospective bidders to keep down
the selling price is not unheard of. In fact this practice became so
serious in Detroit about ten years ago that Paul H. King, referee in
bankruptcy for the district, suggested to the Detroit Association of
Credit Men that a committee be appointed for the sole purpose of at-
tending sales of bankrupt stocks and bidding against the "ring." 26 In
another large city, too, at the present time, there is an instance of
collusive bidding in the operations of a clique of buyers familiarly
known as the "forty thieves." Credit men say that representatives
cases up to that date, in which the assets varied from Si,ooo to between $I5o,ooo
and $2oo,ooo.
The bank officers made the following statement concerning the co6peration
extended the Company by the bar: "The Receivership department has had the
full co6peration of the Bar Association of the city, the New York County Lawyers
Association, and many leading attorneys. Through this co~peration the Trust
Company has been able to call upon these organizations for suggestions in various
cases and draw upon their facilities for advice in merchandizing bankrupt stocks
and in obtaining honest and satisfactory appraisals."
The New York Times, Jan. 17, 1929, said in describing the innovation of one
trust company acting as receiver for the distict: "The plan of designating a trust
company as receiver is said to have worked successfully in Chicago and Detroit.
In isolated instances trust companies have been receivers here, but the plan of
having one company handle bankruptcies for the whole judicial district is wholly
new in New York."
2Cf. infra note 45.
nGeneral Order XVIII provides: "I. All sales shall be by public aucton unless
otherwise ordered by the court. 2. Upon application to the court, and for good
causeshown, thetrustee may be authorized to sell any specified portion of the
bankrupt's estate at private sale; in which case he shall keep an accurate account of
each article sold, and the price received therefor, and to whom sold; which
account he shall file at once with the referee." II U. S. C. A. § 53.
21(i919) BULL. NAT. ASSN. OF CREDIT MEN 365.
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of this group visit every public sale of bankrupt stock in the district
and attempt by concerted action to hold down the price.27
A further problem arises in connection with accounts receivable.
As soon as the word is broadcast that shopkeeper X has been thrown
into bankruptcy, his debtors make little or no effort to pay him.
This condition is partly occasioned by the fact that unless the
receiver attempts to run the business,2 8 the bankrupt's shop will be
closed. With the store doors locked, the debtors owing small accounts
will scarcely go to the trouble of seeking out the receiver or trustee to
pay their bills. As 'a result, the great bulk of small accounts is
usually sold for a few dollars to some lawyer or collection agency.
THE HIGH COST OF ADMINISTRATION
The high cost of bankruptcy administration is brought out in the
summary of statistics for '1926-1927, previously set out. In that
year, the expenses involved in both voluntary and involuntary
estates totalled $21,342,o66.64, or 22.10 per cent of the total net
amount realized from the sale of assets. The administration costs
of the involuntary cases standing alone totalled $14,III,971.33, or
23.18 per cent of the net assets. These figures are especially inter-
esting when compared with the dividend paid to creditors, which
was 8.14 per cent of the claims for all classes of creditors and 6.48
per cent for general creditors. In the involuntary cases only, these
percentages are both slightly higher, being 12.49 per cent for all
classes of creditors and io.ii per cent for general creditors.
Obviously the item of administration plays a great part in reduc-
ing this dividend to so low a figure. In such a highly complicated
system as bankruptcy, every turn of the machinery is accompanied
by some item of expense. For one thing a great many officials are
necessary to perform the various functions outlined by the Act, and
an elaborate fee system has been worked out to provide for their
compensation. The Bankruptcy Act provides fees for referees,2 9
271n reporting the indictment of Charles T. Shongood (see supra note 13) the
New York World, Feb. 5, 1929 said: "The indictment contains two counts in
which the allegations parallel various complaints made by bankrupt creditors over
a long period. These have been, in effect, that bankrupt assets have been sold
for one price and then recorded much lower in the sales report."
2811 U. S. C. A. § II (5).
"The business may be continued for a 'limited period'. These words are in-
tended to indicate that the time should not be protracted, and that the receiver
or trustee should use due diligence in bringing the active business affairs of the
bankrupt to a speedy termination." COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (I3th ed. 1923) 83,
citing In re Lisk, 167 Fed. 411 (W. D. N. Y. I9O8). However, the instance is
rare where the receiver attempts to run the business. 2911 U. S. C. A. § 68 (a).
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trustees, 0 receivers,3' clerks, 2 and marshalls; but these fees are
only a part of those allowed in bankruptcy proceedings.
Compensation for the attorneys representing various parties
totalled $7,306,335.04 in 1926-1927, or 7.47 per cent of the amount
realized from the assets. The petitioning creditors are represented
by counsel, as are also the bankrupt, the receiver, and the trustee.
The services of these lawyers can not be dispensed with under the
prevailing system. For as long as the settlement of insolvent estates
is regarded as primarily a judicial proceeding, it follows that the
various parties must be represented by counsel. Professional skill is
also necessitated by the fact that the court must be petitioned for
permission to make nearly every move involved in settling the estate.
For example, the trustee cannot even file his account in the simple
language of the business community, but instead must follow the
technical form and procedure outlined by the Act, with resulting
attorneys' costs.
In addition to the fees, there are other items of expense. Some of
these are listed separately in the Attorney-General's report as
"printing and advertising," "traveling expenses," and "office ex-
penses," but most of them are grouped under an unexplained blanket
item-"other expenses"-which in 1926-1927 totalled $9,237,655.14.
It may be advantageous to make this analysis of cost more specific
by reference to a case closed during 1926 in the Western District of
Pennsylvania. The record of expenditures in this bankruptcy is
typical of the average cost of liquidation incurred in the smaller
merchant bankruptcies prevalent in and around Pittsburgh.34 The
receiver, later elected trustee, was a man of integrity, who had at his
command a staff skilled in the disposal of bankrupt stocks. Never-
theless, the expenses of administration swallowed up 42.8 per cent
of the amount realized from sale of the assets.
The case went to the bankruptcy court when X, a hardware
merchant, refused to make an assignment for the benefit of his
creditors. After an involuntary petition was filed against him, he
listed his liabilities as $7,593.52, and his assets as $3,797.31 for stock
and fixtures (a fair valuation) and $1,027.84 for accounts receivable.
The stock.and fixtures brought $1,617.5o at public sale on June z,
1926, and the trustee's account shows the following figures:
30Ibid. § 76(a). 3llbid. § 76(d). 32Ibid. § 80 (a). sIbid. § 80 (b).
34 1t is common knowledge among both lawyers and credit men in this district
that a bankruptcy involving assets of less than $15oo rarely pays general creditors
a cent.
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Receipts
Sale of Stock and Fixtures ...................... $,617.50
Collected on Accounts Receivable ................ i65.6o
Interest ....................................... 3.89
$1,786.99
Disbursements
Receiver's bond ................................ $ io.oo
Deposit first meeting of Creditors ................ 35.00
Insurance ..................................... 47.41
Notaries' fees .................................. . 6.50
Receiver's commission ........................... 82.72
Attorney for receiver ........................... 100.00
Receiver's expenses ............................. 61.i9
Trustee's bond ................................. 5.00
Attorney for trustee ............................ 50.00
Trustee's commission ........................... 33.62
Trustee's expenses .............................. 17.75
Attorney for bankrupt .......................... 50.00
Attorney for petitioning creditors ................ 50.00
Expenses of petitioning creditors ................. 38.15
Referee's fees and expenses ....................... 39.95
Clerical aid .................................... 5.00
Taxes ........................................ 27.70
landlord's claim for rent ........................ 123.80
Partial dividend to creditors of 5% ............... 352.44
Administration rent ........................... 70.00
Attorney for trustee ............................ 25.00
Trustee's commission ............................ 34.11
Administration expenses (beat and light) .......... 5.18
Trustee's exnenses .............................. 13.00
Referee's commission ........................... 31.56
Final dividend to creditors of 6.69% .............. 471.91
$1,786.99
Items of special interest in this case are:
Total Th-entor ............................... $4,825.15
Total Arnount ealized ......................... 1,786.99
P eali-ed from Stock and Fixtures ................ 1,617.50
Peali, ed from Accounts Receivable ............... 165.6o
F" -ees of Administration ..................... 766.14
These figures shed additional light on some of the generalizations
made concerning weaknesses in the bankruptcy system. The con-
trast between "total inventory" and "total amount realized" is
specific evidence of two aspects of the marketing problem: (i) the
impnssibility of getting a reasonable price for assets at public sale;
and (2) the difficulty of making collection on accounts receivable
after the business has closed its doors. The item of $766.14 for
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expenses speaks for itself. It amounted to 42.8 per cent of the total
assets realized and left a dividend of only 11.69 per cent for creditors.
Before dismissing this subject of the high cost of administration,
a word should be said concerning the element of fraud, for the elab-
orate technique of fees and expenses affords a fertile field for prac-
ticese5 such as those disclosed in the Southern District of New York.
In fact, these practices are often blamed as the source of all the
apparent inefficiency of bankruptcy administration. But serious as
fraud may be, it is not the only element responsible for "high cost
of bankruptcy." As has been shown, even where the administration
is conducted with the highest possible degree of honesty and efficiency,
as in the case of X, bankruptcy as now constituted proves to be a
costly proceeding.
NON-CO6PERATION OF CREDITORS
The third source of difficulty in the bankruptcy system is the non-
co6peration of creditors in the adjudication-a condition so acute
31The Federal Grand Jury sitting in the Southern District of New York early
in March, 1929, made the following critical report on the bankruptcy of Costis
Takis, trading as the Goody Shops: "We also feel the affairs in the bankruptcy
of Costis Takis should be presented to the Court for its summary consideration.
Property under the receivership has not been accounted for, although the
accounts of the receiver were judicially approved in the middle of 1927. The
circumstances under which three separate attorneys were simultaneously employed
and paid out of the comparatively small estate (out of which no dividend has yet
been paid to the creditors) also demand, in our judgment, summary considera-
tion." [The Referee in bankruptcy and Attorney Edwin F. Corcoran were
exonerated.] New York World, Mar. 2, 1929.
"In the Takis case Helfland was one of the attorneys for the receiver. This is
one of the situations known at the Federal Building in an old baseball expression-
'Evers to Tinker to Chance'. In many of Judge Winslow's bankruptcy cases
where Wilson was named receiver Helfiand would be designated attorney and
vice versa." -bid.
The Referee's petition for the discharge in bankruptcy of Kardos & Burke, a
brokerage firm, contains some interesting side-lights on the question of fees.
This estate, with assets of $307,534, was in litigation for more than five years
and r5o hearings were held. The first receiver in the case was paid $25,ooo after
his first request for $45,000 had been denied. One accounting firm received a
total of $31,804. In fact, the demands of lawyers and accountants were so
exorbitant that they finally had to be cut thirty per cent in order that creditors
could participate at all in the estate. New York World, Apr. IO, 1929.
In connection with fraud in the Southern District of New York, some ac-
knowledgment should be made of the excellent work done by the United States
District Attorney's office. See, for example, the resolution passed by the New
York Credit Men's Association on April I, 1927, at the close of the term of
United States Attorney Emory R. Buckner commending him for "his deep
interest in suppressing commercial crime".
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that the bankruptcy court has virtually become a debtors' court
instead of a creditors' court. It is an important element at two
points in the proceedings: (i) the filing of the petition and (2) the
selection of a trustee.
In the first instance this failure to cooperate is occasioned by the
action of some special group of creditors (or more often a lawyer or
collection agency to whom several creditors' claims have been dele-
gated) who take the lead in filing a petition that other creditors are
not aware of" until notified by the referee to file their claims. This
is made possible by a provision of the Act which permits a limited
number of creditors to file an involuntary petition in bankruptcy. 7
It is a non-cooperation of which the non-cooperating creditors are
ignorant, and it becomes a source of fraud in bankruptcy adminis-
tration, because it lays the way open for the springing up of special
types of the limited group who make a business of collecting creditors'
claims and filing involuntary petitions. Thus a "ring" is created
which stands ever ready to throw an estate into bankruptcy solely for
purpose of graft. 6"
The second point, lack of creditor cooperation in the election of a
trustee, may occur either (a) where the creditor has turned over his
3n"Congress has made no provision for giving notice to creditors of the in-
stitution of involuntary proceedings, other than that which results by the opera-
tion of law from the filing of the petition....-" COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 28,
at 1194.
37i U. S. C. A. § 95 (b). Four years ago the National Association of Credit
Men sent out investigators to interview creditors in all involuntary bankruptcies
closed in Chicago during a certain period. This survey shows that sixty-five
per cent of the creditors involved never gave their consent to the filing of the
petition against the debtor.
The following extract from the 1917 report of former Attorney-General Gregory
is quoted in the New York Times, Dec. 3o, 1927: "An unscrupulous attorney
finds a house running on a narrow margin, learns the names of three creditors,
induces them to fie an involuntary petition, procures the appointment of a
receiver of his own selection, obtains possession of the books of the business,
learns the names therefrom of other creditors, mails them blank forms and pro-
cures proxies, elects his own trustee, procures the appointment of himself as
attorney for the receiver and trustee successively, and so virtually manages the
entire estate to its conclusion."
In speaking of the general public investigation authorized on Mar. 7th by the
six federal judges, the New York World of that date said: "The inquiry also
will go into the phases of bankruptcy petitions. In certain cases it has been
found that a business man in trouble will have three creditors friendly to him
file the petition. Then these creditors ask for a receiver favorable to them. The
receiver in turn has an attorney appointed in sympathy with all hands. By this
method, used more frequently than generally supposed, according to the authori-
ties, a large majority of creditors often are 'frozen out'."
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claim to somebody else or .(b) where the creditor has retained his
claim but simply does not bother to participate in the proceedings.
The results of his turning over his claim to somebody else may be
good or bad. If it is a delegation to an honest responsible agent acting
as a representative for all the creditors, it is not an instance of non-
co6peration. In fact, the pooling of creditors' interests in the hands
of a common agent may be the very means of facilitating efficient
concerted action by the creditors.18 If, however, it is an assignment
of the creditor's claim to a person or persons not a common agent for
all the creditors, the way is again opened for extensive fraud. For a
dishonest assignee may use the claim or claims in his possession for
the purpose of putting one of his fellow ring members in the trustee-
ship.
The creditor's failure to avail himself of his right to participate
in the election of a trustee is of frequent occurrence and leads to the
charge, often made, that the creditor himself is primarily responsible
for the low dividends he receives in bankruptcy. The reason for his
negative attitude is two-fold. In the first place, he knows that co-
6peration will likely be unprofitable; and in the second place, he
knows that co5peration may be useless.
As to the unprofitable aspect of the proceeding, it is scarcely to be
expected that a business man will devote much time and energy to a
project which brings him such small returns as a bankruptcy ad-
ministration. Also there is a feeling prevailing among creditors that a
bankruptcy liquidation is a lawyer's rather than a business man's game.
The formality of the proceeding with its constant resort to petitions
to the court does not appeal to the business man's sense of efficiency.
The procedure is too costly and too drawn out to pay him for either
his money or his time.
In addition to his realization of the unprofitable character of a
bankruptcy litigation, the creditor too often is forced to feel that he
would be coperating in a useless venture. For if a bankruptcy "ring"
of attorneys is in existence, it will usually succeed in controlling the
election as it sees fit. Its device for accomplishing this purpose is to
ask the court for one postponement after another of the first creditors'
meeting until the other creditors wear out and lose out.39 Then, too,
there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Act which requires the court to
38See "The Bureau's Cooperation in Bankr ptcy," infra p. 438.
39
"All questions duly submitteJ - a meedi, (of creditors) must depend upon
.. majority vote for their deze- 4 ation. , is it necessary that there be any
definite quorum as in Englan I: oi, redi -,resent or duly represented and
entitled to vote may choose a t- st -." COLLhL,', op. cit. supra note 23, at iio8,
citing In re Mackellar, i16 Fed. 5 (A. ' ... 1902).
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confirm the candidate whom the creditors wish to select as trustee.
One of the complaints made by credit men in this connection is that
district judges sometimes favor their own political henchmen over
and against the wishes and advice of well-organized creditors' com-
mittees.
40
Such, then, are the principal counts against bankruptcy as now
administered in the United States. (i) It has an unsolved marketing
problem which results in poor returns in the sale of bankrupt stocks.
(2) It has an expense bill so high that a large proportion of what is
realized from the assets is later eaten up in administration costs.
(3) It has engendered in the creditors a spirit of non-co6peration
resulting in a wide open door for fraud.
THE CASE FOR FRIENDLY ADJUSTMENT
Just as the intricate procedural technique of the old English
common law courts eventually defeated the ends for which those
courts were established, so the unwieldy and expensive procedure of
the bankruptcy court has frustrated its declared purpose of serving
the business community. And as the court of chancery, with its
originally simple procedure, grew out of the need of party litigants
for a speedy and efficient administration of justice, so the extra-
judicial method of liquidating a debtor's estate, called "friendly
adjustment,"4' has grown out of the need of creditors for a speedy,
efficient, and economical administration in the case of an embarrassed
or insolvent debtor.
The chief characteristic of the friendly adjustment, in contrast to
the estate in bankruptcy, is that it need adhere to no rigid outline of
procedure such asthat laid down by the Bankruptcy Act. The creditors
in an adjustment do not work through the intervention of a court,
40Favoritism on the part of Judge Winslow in the appointment of political
followers to receiverships, trusteeships, etc., was alleged in Representative La
Guardia's impeachment charges. Mr. La Guardia charged among other things
that Judge Winslow had made repeated appointments of a small group of men to
receiverships, thus creating a "bankruptcy ring." See supra note 12.
41The phrase, "friendly adjustment," for purposes of this discussion, is limited
strictly to describing the extra-legal settlements handled by a creditors' committee
working through an adjustment bureau on the approved list of the National
Association of Credit Men. For obvious reasons, a settlement outside of court
furnishes an even wider field for inefficiency and misappropriation of funds than
does an adjudication in bankruptcy, if worked out by either an unsupervised
creditors' committee or by a private adjustment bureau operated for profit.
See Michael, Problems of a Common Law Assignee (Dec. 1925) CREDIT CRAFT 32;
Incompetent Common Law Trustees (Oct. 1927) N. Y. CREDIT MEN'S AssN. BuLL.
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but through their own liquidating agent, namely, an "approved
adjustment bureau"-a unit which is now an integral part of creditor
organizations in some sixty-eight commercial centers of the United
States. It is a type of settlement founded on the belief, widely ex-
istent in the commercial world, that the disposition of an insolvent
debtor is a business and not a legal function. Under it, the relations
of the parties are governed, not as a status prescribed by statute, but
as a contract voluntarily entered into between the debtor and his
creditor. In this point of view, and in the corresponding freedom
from prescribed technique, there are advantages which will be brought
out presently.
THE APPROVED ADJUSTMENT BUREAU
Before continuing further discussion of the technique used in
friendly adjustments, a word should be said concerning the organ-
ization 2 which creditors have built up in order to administer insolvent
estates outside the bankruptcy court.43 The credit department
-As early as 1877 the friendly adjustment plan was put into practice by the
Board of Trade of San Francisco, which still operates the adjustment bureau of
the San Francisco Association of Credit Men. The National Association of Credit
Men sponsored the adjustment idea early in its career, and by the end of 19o4
brief reports appeared of adjustment bureau activities in LosAngeles, San Diego,
Seattle, and Spokane. (Dec. 1, 19o4) BULL. NTL. ASSN. OF CREDIT MEN 19.
Middlewest and eventually eastern associations of credit men took up the plan.
By June x91o, forty-five bureaus were in operation. Cases totalling liabilities of
more than one million dollars annually were passing through the various bureaus
reporting to the adjustment bureau committee of the credit men at that time.
Report of the Adjustment Bureau Committee, New Orleans Convention, N.A.C.M.
(June 15, 1910) BuLL. NTL. ASSN. OF CREDIT MEN, 508, 511. Unfortunately,
only a few of these earlier bureaus kept adequate records of their activities. At
present there are approved adjustment bureaus located in the following places:
Los Angeles, Oakland (Calif.), San Diego (Calif.), San Francisco, Denver, Wash-
inton, Tampa, Jacksonville, Miami, Atlanta, Augusta, Boise (Idaho), Chicago,
Evansville (Ind.), Indianapolis, South Bend (Ind.), Davenport (Iowa), Des
Moines, Sioux City (Iowa), Wichita (Kan.), Lexington (Ky.), Louisville, New
Orleans, Baltimore, Boston, Springfield (Mass.), Detroit, Grand Rapids (Mich.)
Duluth, St. Paul, Kansas City, Billings (Mont.), Great Falls (Mont.), Omaha,
Newark (N. J.), Buffalo, New York City, Charlotte (N. C.), Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Columbus, Toledo, Youngstown (Ohio), Oklahoma City, Portland (Ore.), Allen-
town (Pa.), Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Providence, Chattenooga, Knoxville,
Memphis, Dallas, El Paso (Tex.), Houston (Tex.), San Antonio (Tex.), Salt
Lake City, Lynchburg (Va.), Norfolk, Richmond, Seattle, Spokane, Tacoma
(Wash.), Clarksburg (W. Va.), Huntington (W. Va.), Milwaukee, Green Bay
(Wis.), Oshkosh (Wis.).
411 am indebted to Mr. E. Paul Phillips, director, Adjustment Bureaus, Na-
tional Association of Credit Men, for the information contained in this paragraph.
The inclusion in this study of much hitherto unpublished material was made
possible by the kindly co6peration of Mr. Phillips.
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representatives of business houses scattered all over the United States
are linked in a powerful nation-wide body known as the National
Association of Credit Men, which was organized at Toledo, Ohio, in
1896. It is this group which has fostered the creation and mainte-
nance by member associations of what is called "an approved adjust-
ment bureau."" Such a bureau is a non-profit-making, incorporated
unit in charge of a manager and manned by heavily bonded, salaried
employees who are specialists in the field of liquidating insolvent
estates and rehabilitating embarrassed debtors. The number of
employees varies with the size of the bureau, but runs as high as
sixty-three in New York City and forty in Los Angeles. Great
expanses of territory are covered in the operations of some of the
bureaus, especially those in the middle and far west. For example,
the Northwestern Jobbers Credit Bureau, with offices in St. Paul,
handles cases not only in the entire territory included within the
Ninth Federal Reserve District, but also in northern Michigan,
northern Iowa, and northern Nebraska. Close touch is kept by
the various bureau staffs with buyers of stocks of all kinds,45 special
stress being laid on the disposition of the assets of insolvents at fair
rather than at forced prices. The St. Paul bureau, for instance, has
on its lists the names of six hundred buyers of hardware stocks lo-
cated within a narrow radius. Elaborate systems, too, have been
worked out for the collection of accounts receivable, the New York
4"'In order to secure the approval of the National Association of Credit Men,
adjustment bureaus are required to comply with strict regulations covering
organization, management, personnel, machinery, policies, protection of clients'
interests, care in correspondence, finances, records, and supervision by local
boards of directors and by the National Association of Credit Men." IN DE-
FENSE OF THE NATION's REcEIVABLES (1927) 9, published by the National
Association of Credit Men.
45"There are many diversifications of the private sale method. Time is usually
the essence of most liquidations because if the sale is delayed too long, rent, in-
surance, custodian charges and other expenses will eat up the estate waiting to be
sold. It is therefore essential to build up an organization with a large mailing
list of buyers so that bids can be solicited and the sale consummated in as quick a
space of time as possible. With the growth of such an organization the time nec-
essary to be taken in getting a satisfactory bid is shortened so that the sale can
be consummated just as quickly as an auction sale. Bulk sales notices are sent
out on every kind of sale, so there is at least a five-day period for solicitation of
bids, and with a good organization this is ample time. Most stocks can be sold
intact in the store where taken over. Sometimes an emergency arises necessi-
tating the removal of a stock. For this reason all large liquidators have a ware-
house, but avery small percentage of stocks handled ever reaches the warehouse."
L. J. Michael, formerly assistant manager of the adjustment bureau, Chicago
Association of Credit Men, writing in (Nov. 1925) CREDIT CRAFT 18.
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Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau reporting that it now is averaging
a fifty per cent return on such accounts. And upon the entire sixty-
eight bureaus now functioning, the National Association of Credit
Men keeps a close check, in order that extremely high qualifications
for remaining upon the approved list may be maintained.
Such then is the type of organization which handles friendly
adjustments. While no two cases are adjusted in precisely similar
fashion, the methods of settlement fall roughly into two classes:
(a) those called extensions in which the business of the debtor is not
wound up, but is kept running through the co6peration of debtor
and creditors; (b) those in which the business is liquidated under an
assignment or deed of trust taken by the agent of the creditors, who
is ordinarily the manager of a creditors' adjustment bureau.
THE EXTENSION CASE
Throughout this discussion special emphasis will be laid upon the
assignment rather than the extension type of case, as the assignment
procedure more nearly approximates an adjudication in bankruptcy.
However, at least something shruld be said concerning this extension
method of saving the debtor in Advance, rather than of watching his
business crash and then attemp ing to pick up the pieces.
The general technique used in an extension is illustrated by the
case of the K Cotton" Dyeing Company, a corporation operating a
plant in territory adjacent to New York City. The case was handled
by the New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau,46 and at the
present time is still in the active file of that bureau.
The K company, during the later months of 1926, found itself
unable to meet its maturing obligations-a condition due primarily
to two causes, dissension among the stockholders and the run down
condition of the plant. A conference of the principal creditors was
held at the offices of the New York adjustment bureau on December
23, 1926. A financial statement of the company presented at the
meeting showed that the plant and equipment were subject to three
mortgages totalling $45,000. In addition, other obligations of the
concern had mounted to $43,000, and it was obvious to the creditor
group that if the company were liquidated, the mortgage debt would
swallow up almost the entire sale price of its assets.
Untrammelled by any rules save those of business judgment
the larger creditors, through the co6peration of the adjust-
ment bureau, began working out the debtor's economic salva-
46A record of this case was placed at my disposal by Mr. Thomas 0. Sheckell
of the New York bureau.
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tion. A corporate control extension agreement was arranged be-
tween the corporation and the creditors, providing that all the
capital stock of the company was to be deposited in escrow with a
member of the bureau as trustee. Several of the larger creditors
were to be placed on the board of directors, and the finances con-
trolled by the election of members of the adjustment bureau as
treasurer and assistant treasurer. This agreement was executed on
January 4, 1927 and ratified at a general meeting of creditors held
at the bureau on January io, 1927.
The advantages that ensued were apparent during the course of
the next two years. In the first six months of 1927 it was possible
to carry the mortgage charges and also to declare a ten per cent
dividend to general creditors. By July i, 1928 the debtor was be-
ginning to pay current accounts on a thirty day basis. During the
fall of 1928 a second ten per cent dividend was paid general creditors.
At the present time the mortgages have been reduced $8,ooo, the
factory is in excellent condition, and no reason exists why the general
creditors should not eventually be paid in full.
Extension cases carefully supervised generally show exceptional
returns to creditors. During 1927, for instance, the Board of Trade
of San Francisco (the Adjustment Bureau of the San Francisco
Association of Credit Men) closed 63 extension cases, in which net
recoveries of $235,087.49 on liabilities of $367,6oo.86 permitted p'ay-
ment of 64 per cent to creditors." And during 1928 the same bureau
closed 61 extension cases with net recoveries of $353,372.03 on
liabilities of $49o,646.32 or 72 per cent to creditors.48 Figures from
other cities show up equally well.4 9
THE ASSIGNMENT CASE
While the extension case is an extremely effective arrangement
where conditions warrant its use, the type of friendly adjustment
more nearly resembling a bankruptcy adjudication and therefore
fairer to consider for purposes of comparison is the assignment case.
The adjustment in this type of case is a liquidation of the debtor's
assets through an assignment to a bureau manager as trustee for the
creditors. Its procedure is set in motion by notification to the
adjustment bureau through one or more creditors of X that X is
delinquent in meeting his accounts. The bureau, thus notified, starts
47(1927) FIFTIETH ANNUAL P-PORT, BOARD OF TRADE OF SAN FRANCISCO.
48(1928) FIFTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, BOARD OF TRADE OF SAN FRANCISCO.
49See (1927) ANNUAL REPORT, Los ANGELES WHOLESALERS' BOARD OF TRADE;
(1928) ANNUAL REPORT, Los ANGELES WHOLESALERS' BOARD OF TRADE.
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action by asking X to come in and talk the matter over. It is here
that a credit man of long experience, such as is the manager of vir-
tually every "approved" adjustment bureau, can be of monumental
service to an insolvent or financially embarrassed debtor. If the
debtor appears to be an honest individual who is willing to lay his
cards on the table and if his economic condition is not entirely hope-
less, the manager rarely will advise bankruptcy, for despite some
evidence to the contrary most insolvent debtors are not persons who
have attempted to cheat their creditors, and the stigma attached to
going through bankruptcy is abhorrent to them. Consequently,
what happens is that the manager and the debtor, with their feet
literally under the same table, work out together the best means for
X to employ in making an adjustment with his creditors.
The next step is for the bureau to call a creditors' meeting for the
purpose of approving or disapproving a settlement outside of court.
Notification of the meeting is sent not to a few but to all of the
creditors, secured and unsecured alike; adjustment bureau practice
strictly insists that each creditor have an opportunity to be heard.
If the creditors approve a settlement outside of court, the debtor
will then be asked to make an assignment of his property to the
bureau manager as a trustee for the benefit of the creditors. The form
of this assignment, which is variously described as a trust deed, or a
trust mortgage, or even a bill of sale, varies in the different jurisdic-
tions, but it always empowers the trustee to sell the property, pay
the expenses of administration, and distribute the residue to the
creditors. Once such a document has been signed, the marketing
organization of the adjustment bureau is free to begin functioning,
and the estate is then liquidated in orderly fashion, the creditors
being advised of each step in the process.
One of the outstanding assignment cases of the last few years is
that of the Y Automobile Manufacturing Company, which was
handled by the adjustment bureau of the Detroit Association of
Credit Men.50 There were four hundred and twenty-nine creditors
involved, with claims originally filed totalling $685,491.85. At the
first meeting of creditors, held in the office of the Detroit adjustment
bureau, the financial condition of the debtor was considered by the
creditors present and by representatives of the debtor. A friendly
adjustment was planned, and a creditor's committee composed of
5 Mr. L. E. Deeley, manager of the adjustment bureau, Detroit Association of
Credit Men, furnished a detailed report of this case, including copies of letters
sent creditors.
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business men of high standing was elected." The committee re-
quested all creditors52 to execute powers of attorney authorizing the
committee either to liquidate or to reorganize the company, and the
creditors complied. After a thorough investigation, the committee
decided that immediate liquidation was necessary. The company,
however, was still operating, and it was essential that operation
should not be entirely discontinued if the goodwill of the business,
believed to be valuable, was to be conserved. Accordingly, the
company executed a mortgage to the manager of the adjustment
bureau as trustee for creditors and the mortgage, in accordance with
its provisions, was foreclosed at once. In the meantime the com-
mittee had been working to reduce the amount of unliquidated claims
and because the plan of sale facilitated the making of similar auto-
mobiles by the new owners, certain large commitment creditors
withdrew or greatly reduced their claims against the Y Company.
The property sold for an excellent price. The proceeds of the sale
enabled the bureau to pay creditors 32% on the amount of claims
allowed, $399,400.67. The total costs of administration were only
xo.6%. Thus settlement was made with every creditor without
resort to a court of law, the first dividend was paid within seven
months, and this large estate was closed in seventeen months.
The Y Manufacturing Company case is exceptional in the number
of creditors involved and in the amount of money and property
passing through the hands of the liquidating agent. It is not ex-
ceptional either as to the high percentage paid creditors on their
claims or as to the low cost of administration. This is demonstrated
in the first of two appended tables, which shows how the liquidating
assignment is meeting the pragmatic test in eighteen different com-
mercial centers of the United States. The figures given are for
assignment cases closed during the years 1926 and 1927, and they
have been analyzed in an attempt to place before the reader the first
statistical summary so far published of results attained in extra-
judicial liquidation of insolvent estates. These figures should be
analyzed and compared with those set. forth in the second table,
containing a similar statistical survey of the bankruptcy cases
5 This committee consisted of E. R. Ailes of Detroit Products Company,
W. R. Cogger of American Bosch Magneto Company, C. W. Dickerson of
Timken-Detroit Axle Company, G. H. Lundberg of E. S. Evans Company, and
Henry E. Mead of American Motor Body Corporation.
'The dealer creditors alone totalled 163 and were scattered all over the United
States, Canada, Mexico, Belgium, Bahama Islands, Columbia, England, Greece,
Hawaii, Haiti, Holland, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Philippine Islands, Poland, Porto
Rico, Spain, Sweden and Venezuela.
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concluded during 1926-1927 in the same judicial districts in which the
respective adjustment bureaus are located.
Some explanation is necessary in order to clarify the assignment
statistics set forth in the first table. In the first place, the period of
time covered in the case of each bureau is twelve months taken from
the years 1926 or 1927 or both, the exact opening and closing dates
concurring with those of the fiscal year of the particular bureau.
This is the same general period covered by the bankruptcy statistics
set out in the second table. It represents the last period for which
complete adjustment bureau statistics are available, the figures for
1928 being as yet too fragmentary towarran tthe deducing of accurate
conclusions.53 The item, "Percentage Cost Administration," is calcu-
lated from the ratio of administration expenses to the total amount
"Realized from Assets."5' And the item, "Percentage Dividend
General Creditors as to Liabilities," is arrived at from the ratio of
the total amount which the general creditors received as to liabilities. 5
5The 1928 figures from five bureaus-San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh-parallel closely those presented here for 1926-1927.
64The St. Paul bureau, although one of the most efficiently managed, shows a
figure of 31.5 for "Percentage Cost Administration." This high figure is ex-
plained by the fact that the bureau includes under the head of "Total Cost
Administration" the items, (i) personal property taxes paid on the debtor's
assets and (2) debtor's exemption. In North Dakota and South Dakota, states
covered by the bureau operations, the debtor's personal property taxes sometimes
are not collected by the taxing officials for periods ranging from two to seven years
prior to the debtor's failure and so must be paid out of the estate. Again North
Dakota has a debtor's personal exemption allowance of $r,ooo in cash or mer-
chandise in addition to absolute exemption on his homestead, household goods,
and wearing apparel. In South Dakota the head of a family has a personal
exemption allowance of $750, plus the absolute exemption on his homestead,
household goods, and wearing apparel.
The Los Angeles bureau deducts the amount paid preferred and secured creditors
and the amount returned to solvent debtors from the total "Realized from
Assets." It then computes its "Percentage Cost of Administration" as the ratio
between the amount remaining in the estate and expenses of administration.
The Pittsburgh bureau has a low percentage figure (12.05) for "Percentage
Cost Administration." However, the general creditors do not reap the full advan-
tage of this efficient management. Landlords in Pennsylvania are given a pre-
ferred claim not only for rent actually accrued at the date of the failure, but also
for rent during the still unexpired term of the lease. From Jan. I, 1926 to Jan. i,
1927, this bureau settled four cases in which the landlord's claim took all the
assets.
6Some of these percentages are computed on the basis of total unsecured lia-
bilities, and others on the basis of total liabilities, secured and unsecured. Bureau
practice varies in the method of arriving at this item, and I am submitting these
percentages in the exact form in which they were given me by bureau managers.
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The following comparative percentages taken from the two tables
tell a rather startling story:
Percentage Percentage Percentage
Dividend Cost Admin- Dividend
General istration General
Creditors To Amount Creditors
To Liabilities Realized To Ant.
Realized
Assignment ........ 27.45 13.85 73.42
Bankruptcy ........ 5.80 24.26 43.32
POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
The two principal extra-judicial methods used by an approved
adjustment bureau, namely, an operating extension and an assign-
ment in trust, have been considered. I shall now examine some of
the possible objections which critics may launch against the adjust-
ment plan of settlement.
First of all, it may be argued that it will be difficult to obtain the
continuously harmonious action of creditors throughout the course
of a settlement, and that lack of harmony may result in embarrassing
legal snarls for the adjustment bureau, for the assignment of a debtor's
business to the bureau manager is an act of bankruptcy, and any
three disgruntled creditors with unsecured claims totalling $5oo or
more may, within four months, "upset the apple cart" by filing a
petition for involuntary bankruptcy.
The answer to this argument is that this catastrophe, admittedly
possible, rarely happens. Creditors are peaceable business men
and they are inclined to rely on court action only as a last resort.
Also, the difficulty of preserving harmony among the creditors is not
so great as might appear offhand, for when creditors are acquainted
with friendly adjustments, they are usually willing to co6perate with
the bureau, simply because it is to their financial advantage to do
so.16 Non-co6peration on their part leaves the bureau with no choice
except to turn the case over to the bankruptcy court for adjudication,
and this, as illustrated in the accompanying tables, is a result which
will bring no pecuniary profit to the objecting creditors. In fact, the
large number of cases concluded each year by the various adjustment
bureaus, a number constantly growing as the knowledge of friendly
66At one stage of the Y Manufacturing Company liquidation, three creditors
who did not understand the nature of the settlement filed a petition in bankruptcy.
However, when the purposes of the friendly liquidation were explained to them,
they not only withdrew their petition but also commended the Detroit adjustment
bureau for its excellent work in the case.
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adjustment becomes more widespread, is in itself conclusive proof
that the bugaboo of non-co6peration by creditors is more apparent
than real. 57
An analysis of these cases, from the point of view of determining
this element of creditor co6peration, brings out some interesting
facts. It is noticeable at once that such co6peration is not necessarily
dependent upon the number of creditors involved nor upon their
location. For example, the files of the Western Pennsylvania Associ-
ation of Credit Men at Pittsburgh (which serves one of the most
thickly populated industrial districts in the world) are filled with
cases involving, for the most part, the failures of small tradesmen,
the majority of whose creditors are located within a relatively narrow
radius. 8 On the other hand, the files of the New York Credit Men's
Association contain the adjustment records of some of the largest
industrial and mercantile failures occurring within the territory
covered, and the creditors are widely scattered.
Specific cases illustrative of this co6perating power of creditors,
regardless of number and location, are the Y Manufacturing Company
Case, already discussed, and the J. Chain Store Corporation Case,59
which follows.
The J. Corporation, operating a chain of grocery stores in South
Florida, became involved financially during 1927. The corporation
owed more than $75,000 to 225 creditors located in thirty states.
The chain had $i3,ooo worth of merchandise on hand and approxi-
mately $45,000 worth of fixtures, the latter being of such a character
that if taken from the store they would have become practically
worthless. Those creditors located in Tampa authorized an assign-
ment of the business to the adjustment bureau of the Tampa Associ-
ation of Credit Men. Creditors situated at a distance were notified
by telephone and telegraph of the resident creditors' action and so
rapidly did they respond that the assignment was either authorized
or ratified by 224 firms and individuals within seventy-two hours.
57There are occasional instances of business houses whose policy is never to
accept less than one hundred per cent on the dollar on accounts receivable, except
in bankruptcy.
58Through the kindness of Mr. L. I. MacQueen, executive manager of this
association, and Mr. H. M. Oliver, manager of the adjustment bureau, I was
permitted to spend several weeks in the bureau office and could observe at first
hand the actual functioning of the friendly adjustment plan of settlement.
59A report of this case was sent by Mr. S. B. Owen, Adjustment Bureau Man-
ager, Tampa Association of Credit Men.
See also the case of the Parham-Lindsay Grocery Company (involving 482
widely scattered creditors), reported in (1923) 25 CREDIT MONTHLY 12.
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The business was kept going and a buyer was secured who took over
the entire chain. The case paid a 35% dividend to creditors at a
cost of only 5% of the amount recouped.
A second objection that may be made to the friendly adjustment
plan is that, while in bankruptcy the debtor receives a full discharge
from his debts, in a contract of assignment for the benefit of creditors
such is not necessarily the case. This objection is hardly worth
considering, as it is entirely possible for the creditors by contract 0 to
release the debtor from the payment of all further claims. Whether
or not the debtor shall enjoy the privilege of a full discharge depends
a great deal upon the character of his specific case and upon the good
faith he shows in dealing with those whom he owes. The matter is
entirely within the discretion of the adjustment bureau, and if the
facts seem to warrant release, the bureau will simply recommend
this to the creditors and supervise the making of contracts between
debtor and creditors that will effect the discharge.
THE BUREAU'S C06PERATION IN BANKRUPTCY
One function of the approved adjustment bureau remains to be
considered. This concerns bureau activity, not outside, but inside
the court of bankruptcy. As has been shown, credit men, whenever
possible, favor the settlement of debtors' estates by extra-judicial
means. However, it sometimes happens that an estate is already in
bankruptcy when the bureau is called in, or a preliminary investiga-
tion of the facts may indicate that the debtor has concealed assets,
or again, this investigation may reveal that conflicting groups of
creditors, through the use of attachments or other available remedies,
have involved the estate in a complicated legal tangle. In these
latter two situations and in all other cases where either the debtor or
the majority of the creditors refuse to play the game, the adjustment
bureau will recommend an adjudication in bankruptcy.
Notwithstanding the fact that the estate may thus be thrown
into bankruptcy, there is no reason why the bureau manager cannot
still be of enormous service to creditors. He may serve them (I) by
600ne form of trust mortgage used by the Wichita Association of Credit Men,
Wichita, Kan., contains the following clause: "It is hereby understood and agreed,
that each and all of the creditors of the party of the first part who shall accept
hereunder do thereby and hereby release and acknowledge as full paid and satis-
fied any and all claims and demands proved hereunder."
"The trust agreement should contain a provision releasing the debtor from his
obligations only after the trustee, acting in cooperation with the creditors'
committee, has found that the case is not tainted with fraud." (July 1927) N. Y.
CREDIT MEN'S AssN. BULL. 240.
.438
BANKRUPTCY OR FRIENDLY ADJUSTMENT 439
representing a group of creditor or (2) by acting as receiver or
trustee.
As to the first of these functions, suffice it to say that although
the receiver and the trustee are supposed to give the creditors a high
type of fiduciary service, as a practical matter it often behooves the
creditors to look out for their own interests. For this reason, a bureau
manager, serving the creditors in a representative capacity, is often
instrumental in curbing the abusive practices so common in bank-
ruptcy administration.
As to the second of these functions, that of serving either as
receiver or trustee, the organization and equipment of the bureau
make it possible for these offices to be filled with a high degree of
efficiency by the bureau manager. As a result, referees in some
districts are constantly appointing bureau managers to receiverships
-for example, in Wichita, Kansas, where Mr. M. E. Garrison,
executive manager of the local association of credit men, is placed
in charge of virtually all mercantile bankruptcies. In some other
cities (as Tampa and Chicago) the adjustment bureau officials receive
no trustee or receivership appointments.
In districts where the bankruptcy court does sometimes appoint
the head of an adjustment bureau as a receiver, there exists the basis
for an interesting comparison with the results achieved by the same
bureaus in their assignment trusteeships. Such an analysis is as fair
as any which can be made of the two systems of liquidation, for the
same marketing organization functions in both instances-in the one
case, untrammelled by the requirements of a statute, and in the other,
restricted by the stipulated procedure of the Act. The same or-
ganization, in the first instance, uses the few simple documents
necessary to legalize an assignment; in the other, it files through an
attorney (with the consequent expense) the endless papers prescribed
for use in a bankruptcy adjudication. In order to bring out
these points of contrast more forcibly, I have considered a group of
cases in which bureau managers acted as receivers or trustees and
have compiled the results in the appended table.
While the table of cases does not include those from Pittsburgh
(the total figures for this district not yet being computed), it happens
that two cases6' closed by that bureau are best suited to the purposes
of an accurate and more detailed analysis. The facts are such that
they bring out in sharp relief the specific results attained under the
61These cases were selected from the files of the Western Pennsylvania Associa-
tion of Credit Men in Pittsburgh by Mr. Paul A. Kerin, who is now in charge of
a branch office of that Association located at Altoona, Pa.
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two systems. Both involved drug stores in Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania,
a borough adjoining Pittsburgh, both had assets that inventoried
about the same (within $200 of each other), and both estates were
closed during the fall of 1927.
The first, an assignment case, involved the A pharmacy. It was
taken over by the bureau on September i 3 th, 1927, and as the debtor
was too involved to justify an operating extension, the bureau
decided to sell the store. An adjuster from the staff succeeded in
getting three prospective buyers interested" in the business, and it
was put up at private sale. The competitors ran up their bids from
$2,000 to $2,750, and at the latter figure a sale was made on September
24th, just eleven days after the case opened. The bureau fee for
handling the adjustment was $275.86, or ten per cent of the sale
price, and all other expenses connected with the liquidation totalled
$3.00. There was a balance for creditors of $2,370.86, or 65.8 per cent
of their claims. The record of receipts and disbursements tells even
more forcibly the story of this excellent recovery for creditors:
Receipts
From sale of business ......................... $2,750.00
Cash from sales to customers .................... 8.6o
From book accounts ............................ 73
$2,759.33
Disbursements
R ent ......................................... $ 101.22
For consignment of goods ....................... 8.39
Expenses of sale ................. 3.00
Bureau commission ............. 275.86
Dividends of 65.8 per cent to thirty-one general
creditors on claims of 83,6o3.14 finally allowed... 2,370.86
$2,759.33
In his final letter to creditors, Mr. H. M. Oliver, the bureau
manager, wrote:
"Our opinion is that if this business had been sold in bank-
ruptcy it would not have brought more than a thousand dollars
and if administered in bankruptcy this would probably have left
a dividend of ten to fifteen per cent."
As in the previous case, the liquidation involving the B pharmacy
began as an assignment, the case opening March ig, 1927. The case
was, however, turned over to the bankruptcy court for adjudication,
because the debtor was unwilling to co6perate in a manner satisfactory
to the bureau. The bureau manager was appointed receiver and later
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elected trustee. It was found necessary to close the store a few days
prior to the filing of the petition and to keep it closed through the
long period of liquidation, ending November 8, 1927. The rent
accruing until the business was finally sold at public auction for Si,-
105.00 totalled $2o0. The debtor took his entire exemption of $3o0,
and these items, together with administration expenses and a couple
of preferred claims, ate up all the estate except $195.o8, which was
paid to general creditors. As the unsecured liability claims allowed
totalled $4,810.72, these creditors received only 4.05 per cent. The
complete receipts and disbursements in the case follow:
Receipts
From sale of business ...........................
From sale of perishable property .................
Cash on hand .................................
Interest .......................................
Disbursements
$1,105.00
62.50
127.89
1.52
$1,296.91
Expenses nrst meeting oi crecutors ............... 0 30.00
Appraisers' fee.. : .............................. . 30.00
N otary fees ................................... 5.50
Receivers' bond ................................ . MO.O
Receivers' expenses ............................. 39.56
Attorney for receiver ........................... 125.00
Receiver's commission .......................... 631.32
Trustee's bond ................................. 5.00
Trustee's expenses ............................. 10.00
Trustee's commission........................... 24.17
Attorney for trustee ................... ......... . 25.00
Referee's expenses .............................. . 27.00
Referee's conm ission ........................... . 10.44
Attorney for bankrupt ........................... 50.00
Bankrupt's exemption .......................... 300.00
Insurance ..................................... 49-34
Rent during administration ..................... 200.00
Rent prior to bankruptcy (preferred) ............. 50.00
Wages due prior to bankruptcy (preferred) ........ 49.50
First dividend of one per cent on forty-three claims
of $4,810.72 ...................................... 48.11
Second and final dividend of 3.05 per cent on forty-
three claims of $4,810.72 ........................... 146.97
81,296.91
In attempting a comparison of these two liquidations, several
items are noteworthy. In the first place, although the assets were
of about the same value, the amount realized from assets was $2,759.33
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in the one case and only $1,296.91 in the other. In the second place,
although the estates were administered in the same district at about
the same time, the expenses in the first amounted to only $388.47,
but in the bankruptcy case ran up to $1,io.83. As a result of these
figures, the creditors in the assignment case realized a dividend of
65.8% on their claims, and in the bankruptcy case only 4.08%.
In fairness, however, it must be said that the contrast between
these respective percentages is slightly qualified by several factors.
The unsecured claims finally allowed in the bankruptcy case exceeded
those in the assignment case by $1,207.58, and the bankruptcy case
also had additional preferred claims of $99.50. But the remarkable
thing about it is that if we make allowance for the difference in
claims by deducting $99.50 from $2,370.86 (net amount payable to
general creditors in the assignment case) and by adding $1,207.58
(additional unsecured claims) to the general liabilities figure of the
adjustment case, we still have a net amount, payable to the general
creditors in the assignment case, which allows them a dividend of
47% on their claims.
It is therefore fair to conclude that, with the concurring factors of
equal assets, equal liabilities, same type of business, and same
locality in two cases liquidated in the fall of 1927 by the same market-
ing organization, the two different types of administration result in
dividends of 47% and 4.08% respectively!
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this article, reference was made to a situation
existing in New York City which indicates that there is something
seriously wrong with our system of bankruptcy administration. It
has been my purpose to discover, if possible, why this condition exists.
The development, therefore, has consisted of a critical analysis of
bankruptcy, from the standpoint of both theory and practice, which
has involved (i) a consideration of what the objects of bankruptcy
legislation are and (2) an application of the pragmatic test to de-
termine whether these objects are met in actual bankruptcy adminis-
tration.
The chief purpose of bankruptcy legislation is to furnish a method
for liquidating the estate of an insolvent debtor and distributing the
assets to his creditors. Therefore, the results of bankruptcy admin-
istration are best demonstrated by the figures furnished in the
Attorney General's Report of Bankruptcy Proceedings. These reveal
as an outstanding thing a very low percentage of distribution to
creditors in proportion to their liabilities. It is the factors operating
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to produce this result that constitute the chief counts against the
bankruptcy system. As already shown, they are the marketing
problem, the fee problem, and the non-co6peration of creditors in
the adjudication.
On further analysis these three problems reduce themselves to one
major defect in theory and two outstanding faults in practice. The
theoretical flaw is simply that bankruptcy regards the whole matter
of insolvency as a legal and not primarily an economic problem.
The practical faults are (i) high cost of administration, and (2)
loopholes for fraud. Under each of the latter two lies the common
cause for both-an unwieldy and cumbersome technique.
Apparently, then, the objects of bankruptcy legislation are not
met in our present bankruptcy administration-at least not in such
a manner as to serve the needs of the business community. This is
demonstrated not only in the non-co6peration of creditors in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, but also and more forcibly in the fact that the
commercial world has worked out a system of its own for dealing
with the insolvent debtor-namely, friendly adjustment. When we
apply the same analysis to friendly adjustment that was applied to
bankruptcy, we find (i) that its objects are practically the same as
those of bankruptcy and (2) that, contrary to bankruptcy, it is
meeting the pragmatic test by functioning well. The statistics fur-
nished by a representative group of approved adjustment bureaus
show that, on the average, creditors receive five times the amount
of dividends they do in bankruptcy and at about half the cost. Theo-
retically, friendly adjustment, in contrast to bankruptcy, rests on
the true concept that insolvency is about nine-tenths an economic
problem and one-tenth a legal one. Practically, friendly adjustment
eliminates the high cost of bankruptcy, because a simplified technique
stipulates for only one fee, that received by the bureau, and the same
simplified technique reduces to a minimum the possibility of fraud.
In other words bankruptcy, because it is a costly, technical,
cumbersome system, founded on a false theory, is failing to carry out
its major purpose. Friendly adjustment, an extra-judicial means,
because it is a simple, inexpensive procedure founded on a true theory,
is at present serving a large part of the business world as a bankruptcy
court.
What, then, is the remedy for the present unfortunate condition
of bankruptcy administration? The first step, as in the progress of
any reform, is in arousing public sentiment to a realization of existing
conditions. In this respect, substantial progress has apparently
been made by the instigation in New York City of a general public
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inquiry into bankruptcy evils. The courageous stand taken by the
public press in the whole question has been largely responsible for the
extension of public interest beyond the confines of New York City.
Already there have been two Congressional committees appointed
to investigate special phases of the New York situation, 2 and on
April 23rd a resolution was introduced into Congress, directing that
the United States Attorney-General be asked to aid the New York
investigation. Whatever the immediate result may be, all these
things bid fair to make the demand for reform nation-wide.
One of the most favorable aspects in the investigation now under
way in New York City is that the federal prosecutor has the co-
6peration of the bar associations and the National Association of
Credit Men. This combination of the legal and economic elements
is, in my estimation, an essential factor in any proposed change in
our bankruptcy law, for, as already pointed out in this discussion,
if legislation is really to serve the business community, the practical
business man's point of view must be taken more largely into ac-
count than it has been in the past. In fact, the co6peration of both
lawyers and business men is absolutely necessary for working out
the various aspects of the market problem and the fee problem that
are present sources of difficulty.
It is my purpose to set out in a future article some detailed sug-
gestions for a statute, general in nature, designed to assist the
business world in dealing with insolvency. Suffice it to say here
that such an enactment (i) should take into account both the legal
and economic aspects of the insolvency problem; (2) should provide a
simpler, less technical procedure; and (3) should not attempt to
place all insolvency in one fixed category. 3
6New York Sun, Feb. 25 and 27, 1929. Ibid. Apr. 24, 1929. See supra note 12.
6The Bankruptcy Act declares that "an" insolvent is one whose aggregate
property (minus any property concealed or removed with intent to defraud
creditors) is insufficient in amount to pay his debts. ii U. S. C. A. § 1 (I5).
For settling the estate of such "an" insolvent a fixed procedure has been outlined.
On the other hand, credit men recognize various classes of insolvency and govern
their procedure accordingly.
"Insolvent estates may be divided into eight classes; namely,
(a) debtors find themselves in embarrassed conditions due to poor manage-
ment, drop in market, etc., and business requires either liquidation or re-organiza-
tion, no fraud or preference of any kind being involved;
(b) similar to (a) with the exception that some preferences have been granted;
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(c) some preferences have been granted, and theoretical concealment of small
amount developed by accountants, but no false statement;
(d) there is some fraud but not sufficient proof to convict either for concealment
or for false financial statement, and probability of developing same in bank-
ruptcy is nil;
(e) debtor has issued financial statement substantially false, no concealment of
assets but some preference granted;
(f) debtor has issued financial statement substantially false, but admittedly no
concealment or preferences;
(g) debtor has issued substantially false financial statement or concealed large
amount of assets, and legal proof thereof can be obtained only by investigation
in bankruptcy proceedings;
(h) bankrupt has concealed assets." (July, 1927) N. Y. CREDIT MEN'S AssN.
BULL. 241.
